Setting Speed Limits:

Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Presented CTCDC Meeting 02/23/2006

02/23/2006

By Chad Dornsife, Director

Best Highway Safety Practices Institute

Forward:

Setting speed limits that meet the safety needs of the government, advances the publics’ general welfare, reduces accidents and ensures motorists’ due process is possiblecan be achieved. . The answer that will meet the safety needs of the state while providing due process is already the very foundation of our nation’s traffic control laws. . All we have to do is apply them. . This paper will outline our governing traffic control law’s foundation, Best Practice, and provide constructive guidance for the traffic engineers to make us all safer. .

California has the opportunity here in adopting their MUTCD supplement, combined with their legacy speed trap law, to lead the nation in setting meaningful guidelines for proper engineering studies to be used to determine posted limits, a. And more importantly, reduce accident rates vis-à-vis better guidance to the practitioners.

The nexus for this paper was a comment made by a traffic engineer at the July 2005 meeting of the California Traffic Control Device CommitteCommittee. He; he asked for an agenda item for the November meeting to review traffic-engineering requirements in regards to setting speed limits. . The source of his consternation: his surveys had been found in violation of California’s speed trap laws because he had not complied with its mandates.

Having reviewed the facts of this case that was overturned, notable was his lack of understanding of the governing law, its foundations and Best Practice. . Irrespective of the fact he also violated California’s speed trap law, he didn’t appear to understand the very object of an engineering study, or how and why speed limits should be set. . Even more disconcerting is the fact that this is not an isolated case, either. . It’s emblematic of the complete break down in Best Practices, here, and around the world. . Simply stated, current practice meets neither the safety needs of the public nor due process.

Table of Contents

Forward ………………………………………………………… Page 1

Primary Engineering Tenets and Rationales

in regards to Speed Limits …………………………………….. Page 3

The battle to control the setting of speed limits

is literally killing us! …………………………………………… Page 4

Legal Status of a Speed Limit Sign ……………………………. Page 11

Speed Limit Sign Use in California – Noncompliant ………. Page 15

85th Percentile, Human Nature, Posted Limits

Relative Risk and How they Relate

Basic Tenets of Speed Laws: …………………………. Page 18

All accidents aren’t preventable,

but those that are, are predictable: ………………….. Page 19

Excerpts from salient examples

between speed facts and versus myths: ……….…….. Page 22

Nationally accepted practices: ……………………..…. Page 24

Charts from Federal studies that dramatically

illustrate the disparity between public policy

and widely held myths about the safety effects

speed, and research findings on best practice

and relative risk. . ………………………………………………. Page 28

What is Best Practice in Setting Speed Limits,

Best Highway Safety Practices Institute

MUTCD supplement to 2B.13

Speed Limit Sign ………………………………….……. Page 38

MUTCD supplement 1A.13

New Definitions …………………………………….…… Page 40

ADDENDUM

Traffic Engineering Study Work Sheet/Check List

(link will be added when posted on web site)

Primary Engineering Tenets and Rationales in regards to Speed Limits:

The following excerpt is from a speech given to engineers about their responsibilities in establishing proper and realistic speed limits. . It is accredited to Mathew C Sielski, former International Institute of Transportation Engineers President (ITE), and bestowed the highest honor that the ITE can give for lifetime achievement to their profession. . The often-quoted text below can be found in many state DOT handouts and websites.

One of the most important responsibilities of traffic engineers is the establishment of proper and realistic speed limits. . Our profession has long recognized that most citizens will behave in a reasonable manner as they go about their daily activities. .

Thus, traffic laws that are based upon behavior of reasonable motorist are found to be successful. . Laws that arbitrarily restrict the majority of motorist encourage wholesale violations, lack of public support, and usually fail to bring about desirable changes in driving behavior. . This is especially true of speed limits. .

Our profession, since the early 1930’s, based its speed zoning techniques on several concepts deeply rooted in our American system of government and law, namely:

1. . Driving behavior is an extension of our social attitude, and the majority of drivers respond in a safe and reasonable manner, as demonstrated by their good driving records. .

2. . The careful and competent actions of a reasonable person should be considered legal. .

3. . Laws are established for the protection of the public and the regulation of unreasonable behavior of an individual. .

4. . Laws cannot be effectively enforced without the consent and voluntary compliance of the public majority. .

Our profession also recognizes that an emotionally aroused public will reject these fundamentals and will rely on more comfortable and widely held misconceptions, such as:

1. . Speed limit signs will slow the speed of traffic. .

2. . Speed limit signs will decrease accidents and increase safety. .

3. . Raising a posted speed limit will cause an increase in the speed of traffic. .

4. . Any posted speed limit must be safer than an unposted speed limit, regardless of the prevailing traffic and roadway conditions. .

Before and after studies have proven conclusively that these are definitely misconceptions. . Unfortunately, in too many instances, influential pressures succeed in the application of such unrealistic regulations.

The battle to control the setting of speed limits is literally killing us!

From an engineering perspective an “Engineering Study” is, in effect, a periodic safety audit of roadway or highway system, and the setting of reasonable speed limits is a byproduct of that process. Engineering studies have been required on all roadways open to public travel since 1988. The following sections will clearly explain the rationales behind setting speed limits and Best Practice. Before that though, we must make it clear regarding speed limits, this is not an intellectual debate per se, because this truly is a safety issue. Because the statutory minimum required establishing a speed limit is an engineering study, a safety review of a roadway system. They are not being done, and worse NHTSA has undertaken a successful campaign to eliminate their importance altogether. Public safety has clearly been sacrificed to special interests, and they are literally killings us by the thousands to maintain their power and financial base. Strong words. Yes! But true, and here are some of the facts for background.

Engineering studies create data. Data can be analyzed for voracity because they require an actual safety review of a roadway or roadway system. All traffic control decisions are to be based on this factual finding, applying nationally recognized Best Practices, and not local or state traditions. Every entity in the country has been certifying they have been doing engineering studies on every roadway and bike path open to public travel, since 1988, per federal safety laws. This is being done in order for the states to receive federal highway funds. That being said, many states do not do them at all, never have, and even the states that do them, they do not do them on the majority of their roads. The few studies that are done rarely are comprehensive, read never. The FHWA has a policy of no standards oversight or enforcement. Public entities do not like studies because they cost money, the special interest do not like them because they quantify what the public consensus’ safe for conditions speeds, which are usually 10 to 15 mph over most posted limits.

We have the money to enforce the laws 24/7 365 days a year - never shown to reduce accidents as practiced. Conversely, we do not have the money to assure the governing law is complied with to establish the safety value to be posted. Why? This requires an engineer or his staff to take a few days every 5 years to look at traffic speeds, volumes, accident rates, and traffic control to make sure it is meeting the needs of traffic – the proven way to reduce accidents.

The Science of Traffic Engineering has been hijacked because its collective body of knowledge was seen as a direct threat to the special interests of a few. The engineers’ lost their oversight authority and responsibility, and more significant because of the net results has been the publics’ general welfare being sacrificed. The USDOT standards oversight consist of a wink here, a blind eye there, a removal a key safety standard to stop challenges of unsafe practices or to assure no standards could be enforced.

Consequently, 18 years after federal law mandated uniformity of all traffic control in the nation, regardless of jurisdiction or state lines, to be based on a actual review of the particular roadway being regulated, conducting true mandated comprehensive engineering studies are such rare events, they are virtually non-existent. This lack of leadership and guidance is not by accident either. It’s the result of the USDOT’s disdain for standards enforcement and complete indifference to the dire consequences these policies have inflicted on society. A dichotomy of purpose, between their charter that placed the Department of Transportation in the Presidents cabinet to oversee highway infrastructure and safety; compared to their actions to assure their own self interest first, then their special interest constituents and those that profit from these enterprises - to the detriment of the “general public welfare”. When aggregated, the USDOT oversight of our highway safety standards has resulted in a human catastrophe.

Thus, the USDOT is directly responsible for tens of thousands of deaths as well as unimaginable mayhem and tragedy for the families of hundreds of thousands, and more. Of the 40,000 deaths a year on our roadways, at least a quarter of them are caused by the USDOT’s negligent oversight. The shear numbers of unnecessarily killed and injured is just staggering. Nevertheless, when you look at each roadway and current practices, and extrapolate the results to a nation, it becomes an incontrovertible fact. USDOT policies are killing 10,000 plus men, women, and children a year!

Under the USDOT stewardship of our Nation’s standard, despite the indisputable core tenets of the traffic engineering profession’s body of knowledge, the setting of speed limits has digressed into a minimalist exercise to comply with substandard regulations; or an exercise in reverse engineering to sustain an otherwise unobtainable outcome; or an act of the omnipresent and growing practice of posting of arbitrary and capricious invented (unsafe) values.

Again, the shear numbers of unnecessary deaths and injuries are a national scandal, but this paper is about California, a state where the law purports to require engineering studies. Whereas, in fact, current practices have digressed in most cases into nothing more than a perfunctory shell of reverse engineering to support under posted limits, that masquerade as engineering studies. Every time an attorney sends us a study to review, it’s the same. These purported studies fail to meet the safety needs of the public and deny due process. Universally, they are contrived to report lower than actual speeds via selective or inadequate data collection.

The MUTCD begins the definition of an engineering study as a comprehensive analysis, not a spot speed survey or a document that lists items required without an in-depth review or analysis. Most studies are taken from as little as a 10-minute sample of traffic or in an incredible manner where every key component of the processes is extremely susceptible to subjectivity or manipulation. This week’s example of a purported study that was sent to us for review was from the City of Los Angeles. It was recertified in 2004, originally performed in 1997, and the reported accidents noted were from 1991-1993. Major Arterial, critical speeds from 50 vehicle samples taken from proscribed impeded flow points; one adjacent to school close to an intersection, and the other at a roadway choke point where it goes from 96 feet to 68 feet wide. The form did have a tally of speeds, but the math used to support the reported 85th percentile speed was creative math, because the tally sheet didn’t support the lower number shown. In this section, the majority of the accidents were occurring at one intersection, whereas, all the accidents were attributed to speed over the entire section. What was done to mitigate for the accidents? Nothing! Their end work product resulted in a speed trap, while the unsafe conditions continue to kill and injure motorists more than a decade after they were documented to exist!

Current federal law presumes, and mandates, that an engineer oversee the process and that all roadways be periodically reviewed, whereas in fact, the overwhelming majority of our roadways have never had an engineering study. For smaller entities there is no traffic engineer to consult. Therefore, the state or local political entities just simply invent the value to post, and/or assign unqualified public works staff or the local police to determine what the posted limit should be, all are proscribed practices.

How does the FHWA plan on solving this wide spread non compliance, non enforcement and anarchy in uniform application and practices dilemma and known chief cause of accidents that are otherwise preventable? By removing the mandate and adding additional arbitrary and capricious categories of speed limit signs and all traffic control devices based on proscribed local political conjecture in the next MUTCD, again, to the peril of all.

Make no mistake about it, poor engineering practices and the lack of safety reviews is the greatest threat to motorists, not speed, drunk drivers, road rage etc, and these unsafe conditions couldn’t exist, except with the full support of the USDOT.

Study: Bad roadways big factor in traffic deaths 


http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/06/23/dangerous.roads/index.html


From Kathleen Koch 
CNN 
Monday, June 23, 2003 Posted: 5:07 AM EDT (0907 GMT)

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A new study finds roadways -- not driver error or faulty vehicles – to be a significant factor in crashes that claimed more than 24,000 lives between 1998 and 2001.

Some believe the Reader’s Digest Magazine and AAA’s numbers here cannot be supported because of the small sample size. (http://www.rd.com/content/openContent.do?contentId=17988) What aren’t in dispute are the accident reductions that were obtained, and when this program was later expanded to other locations, the results were the same. More importantly, what the AAA of Michigan failed to realize, what they were observing was an omnipresent legacy of unsafe practices, no standards or access management oversight, or the mandated critical roadway safety audits being done. Nor did their estimates include whole categories of like unsafe practices that have become institutionalized.

Here, too, is a quote from a study that confirmed engineering remedies DO reduce accidents; notable because it is also missing-in-action in the federal reference knowledgebase as it did not support their "Stop Red Light Running" automated enforcement agenda. Automated enforcement demands that a traffic control deficiency be first quantified, then remain uncorrected. Such unsafe conditions become the financial viability foundation that the automated systems require to exist.

BIG RESULTS FROM SIMPLE FIXES

http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/NovDec99.pdf

The program has produced astonishing results: During the first 27 months of the four demonstration projects in Detroit, crashes decreased by 47 percent, with a 50 percent reduction in injuries. "The interesting part of the program is that most of these very large crash reductions have been done with low-cost projects," Feber says. "You don't have to spend a million bucks."

If we have hard data supporting the efficacy of engineering countermeasures, why aren’t these successes being heralded? The answer is $afety, not safety.

It is absolutely inconceivable how the agency charged with championing Best Practices has undertaken the lead in a campaign to eliminate Best Practice altogether. The new MUTCD purports to authorize a complete cessation of studies and dissolution of standards mandates.

Regardless of the dedicated work of many FHWA engineers, or if you agree with our assertions or not, it is a moot point because the end effect is the same. Under the current FHWA’s stewardship, our prior Best Practice standards have been decimated. It becomes an extremely deadly combination when added to the fact that most roadways in the country have never had a study in the first place. Especially since the overwhelming majority of what few studies that are done are not engineering studies at all as defined by the MUTCD.

1. Significant numbers are nothing more than contracted spot speed surveys of as few as 50 vehicles, over as little as a 10-minute period, and tallied with creative math

2. Reporting all vehicles speeds, rather than the mandated free flowing speeds

3. They use radar/lidar, which in and of itself has been documented to result in lower unrepresentative speeds being reported

4. Extremely subjective because the surveyor picks and chooses which vehicles to include. In court testimony it has become crystal clear they are instructed to chose locations and/or receive some other guidance not to count too many faster moving vehicles

5. Most common violation is they measure from proscribed locations: chokes points, stop signs and traffic signals, school zones when kids are out, intersections, curves, includes slower vehicles entering/exiting the stream, and use other locations chosen to preclude higher traffic speeds, etc.

6. They contain no review of hazards or efficacy or condition of existing traffic control devices.

7. No site-specific review of accidents, by location or cause, or no review whatsoever.

8. Conducted by laypersons, including police departments who also set the limits.

These are their safety audits, meant to comply with the law for the next 7-10 years, and this represents the Best Practice for our nation? Moreover, the few engineering studies (safety audits) that are being done apply both poor and/or unauthorized engineering and traffic control practices. Consequently, the only known remedy to preventable accidents is not part of our highway safety programs, anywhere.

More incredulous, of those accidents that are preventable, the overwhelming majority are clearly design problems. Under the new wording and focus within the USDOT and the NHTSA FARS (Federal Accident Reporting System) system, all accidents are attributed solely to driver error; with no mention, whatsoever, of engineering countermeasures or faults, which are the major cause.

When you state this in plain English it means that for almost two decades now the FHWA’s inaction and gross oversight negligence has been directly responsible for in excess of 10,000 deaths a year and tens of thousand more injuries. Why? A significant portion of the answer is the politics behind sustaining an estimated 50,000,000 citations being issued each year to motorists that, according to FHWA itself, are driving safe for conditions! In the battle between the well being of special interests, government agencies and their funding vs. the lives of the people, the people have clearly lost!

The source of this ignorance is a concerted and very successful effort by the USDOT to intentionally dilute and undermine Best Practice, combined with a heretofore refusal to support their staff when they attempt to garner compliance.

Consequently, contemporary practitioners no longer have reliable knowledge resources to draw upon, nor guidance based on fact, or realize that the MUTCD is governing law in regards to traffic control. Even more incredulous, the FHWA/NHTSA went so far as to sponsor speed limit workshops around the country to discredit Best Practices. During these day-long events, no subject matter experts, whatsoever, on setting limits were presenters, nor did anyone mention that the MUTCD is controlling law at these conferences. No wonder practitioners and their political overseers wrongly believe their own personal opinion, or the local government, and/or state statutes are the final authority.

For safety and due process to be achieved, the following best practices are absolute requirements:

1. That all traffic control in the Nation has one appearance and expectation on all roads open to public travel regardless of jurisdiction type or classification

2. That all traffic control decisions be based only on nationally recognized fully vetted Best Practice

3. That this process is to be supervised by licensed professionals applying points 1 and 2 without exception

4. If the licensed practitioner has an idea for improving existing practice, there is procedure prescribed in the MUTCD to request permission from the FHWA HOTO to experiment and document the results

5. That periodic comprehensive reviews of all roadways shall be done to ascertain traffic volumes, speeds, accidents, roadway characteristics and the efficacy and condition of existing traffic controls; this shall be documented

6. This safety audit shall contain action items noting those areas or conditions that may need remedies to further improve flow, sight distances, volumes, guidance or hazard mitigation

Note: To further promote safety, Congress adopted 23 USC 409 so that this information could not be used in a tort action either; therefore, there is no credible impediment to documenting forthcoming suggestions or remedy solutions.

These are the very foundation to safer roads and reducing preventable accidents. With “The Highway Safety Act of 1966” Congress put into motion a highway safety plan that required all traffic control devices on public roadways in the nation be based on sound engineering principles and practices. Congress also required this safety plan to have a common “basis in fact” determination, appearance and application, regardless of state lines or classification of jurisdiction.

In this Act, Congress entrusted this solely to licensed traffic engineering professionals and their institutions. The prescribed process requires all changes in the law be an improvement in practice. It requires studies to test each thesis, peer review and verification before a standard, practice or procedure can be incorporated into Title 23 et al. It also requires that ALL traffic control device use be contingent upon full compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations and its National MUTCD, without exception! It is a single, universally applied engineering standard, with federal statutory requirements in appearance, application, procedure and practice.

These tenets of the engineering profession have been perverted to facilitate special interest or to deflect oversight responsibilities away from the FHWA. Over the last decade, the overseers of our nation’s safety policies have systematically removed the very foundations of prior Best Practice. This purging of any and all roadway engineering countermeasures and safety mitigation based programs was included in the 1998 rewrite of the “Highway Safety Act of 1966”, where the USDOT shifted the onus of highway accidents to the driver and away from poor engineering practices.

This attack on Best Practice by the USDOT has also uncovered some interesting facts. A recent USDOT sponsored/preordained study designed to undermine Best Practice and support for speed cameras, the Arizona DOT surveyed 50 states on their current speed limit setting practices. (RE: Final Report 551: Actual Speeds on the Roads Compared to the Posted Limits October 2004) Of the 48 that replied, no two had the same practice. Not one had complied with either Best Practice or the law. NONE!

The irony here is that this USDOT study quantified their own gross negligence and oversight failure. In 1988, the uniformity mandate expanded from look and shape of all traffic control devices to include application and expectation based solely on Best Practice for all traffic control on roadways and bicycle paths in the nation, regardless of state lines or jurisdiction. In this survey, the USDOT sponsored study couldn’t even find two states that used the same procedures, let alone comply with the law. Even more incredulous, in another study 40 years after their mandate to bring the look and shape of all devices under one standard, noncompliant devices and errant practices are the norm. So much so, that a recent FHWA synopsis on device applications filled over a hundred pages with samples of noncompliant device use.

What you read here is largely applicable to California. After reviewing hundreds of studies, all have had serious problems regardless of entity type, including Caltrans, and virtually all could be and/or were successfully challenged in court. Moreover, none met the safety needs of the public. Worse, even the conscientious engineering practitioners who attempted to do the right thing, do not comply. For example, Oakland just spent over 250 thousand dollars bringing their surveys current. However, upon review, all can still be successfully challenged in court. It’s the same in every jurisdiction we’ve examined across the country.

Here is an insightful comment from a discussion of design, operating and posted limits. It sums up current practice.

2003 NCHRP Report 504 reports a new factor.

… "To an open-ended question," respondent engineers placed "politics" way above the engineering factors as the number one reason for "deviation" from the 85 percentile operating speed.

With this political reality of "politics" controlling sound engineering traffic engineering studies, compliance with the MUTCD becomes impossible.”

Just because the USDOT refuses to enforce its own standards and provides no real oversight, this doesn’t prevent motorists from challenging illegally adopted traffic laws. A facsimile of an official traffic control device is unenforceable as a matter of law, absent the minimum statutory requirements to determine the safety value posted, or if it is based on an arbitrary and capricious value. In accidents where someone dies, it has become popular practice to charge motorists involved with either manslaughter or homicide. If this is the case, what should we do with public officials and/or employees that exceed their power and/or through expedience fail to perform their duties? If it’s indisputable that properly done and applied safety audits (engineering studies) can substantially reduce accidents and we do not act when it’s our professional duty and mandate to do so, aren’t the resulting deaths and serious injuries negligent manslaughter, or homicide?

Can California turn back the clock and rescind its engineering requirements as was advocated at the CTCDC meeting? In a word, no, because the core components of California’s speed trap law and the old Caltrans Traffic Manual’s guidance have been included in the minimum federal safety requirements (Best Practice) - MUTCD.

If you want safer roadways and to ensure due process for the motorists, then conduct comprehensive engineering studies, because it is the only way you will ever be able to realize the long coveted safer roads and sustainable fair laws, as well!

There is hope! There are some engineers who will not be deterred by the gauntlet of pressure to deviate from their professional responsibilities. In doing so, these unheralded heroes make us all safer. Our honoree’s (below) work habits and processes have made a significant difference. These practices need to be studied and shared as a foundation for all to benefit from. Celebrating the contribution of these dedicated individuals cannot be overstated.

Special Note of Honor: Jerry Gabriel P.E., Caltrans District 9 Operations Engineer. His dedication to his professional duties as an engineer comes first. Consequently, he has saved many lives and hundreds of injuries. Regardless of the posted limits, local political pressure, or if the rules require a study, Gabriel has made sure that all traffic control in his district meets the needs of traffic by reviewing all roadways as to prevailing speeds, sight distances, hazard mitigation and accident causes by location. He then applies prescribed remedies, tracks the results, and makes necessary adjustments as required. At every location where the indicated traffic control remedies have been applied, accident reductions have been dramatic! Gabriel is a model of what every engineer should aspire to be. Thank You, Jerry, for a job well done!

Legal Status of a Speed Limit Sign:

The Manual On Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), published by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), is the national standard for traffic control devices, signs, signals, markings, and other devices used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. . To implement the 1966 Highway Safety Act and laws related to federal aid highways, the Federal Highway Administration adopted regulations requiring that all traffic control devices on all streets open to the public conform to national standards prescribed in the MUTCD.

Whereas as a matter of law, a “Speed Limit Sign” is a federal device (federal designation R2-1) whose use by California and all political subdivisions therein is conditional upon compliance with governing law, and the minimum statutory requirements of Title 23, United States Code, Section 109(d) and Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 655.601 through 655.603, and its National Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)^[1], Speed Limit Sign; Section 2B.13^[2]. .

Moreover 2B.13 contains a SHALL precondition ‘after an engineering study’ and it SHALL be done under the supervision of an engineer applying nationally recognized practices and standards that the engineer could cite as opposed to local or state legacy practices, and it SHALL be documented. . An unambiguous mandate that the safety value posted on a speed limit sign have a uniformly determined factual foundation based on vetted Best Practice.

Section 1A.13 in this Manual

“Standard:

Unless otherwise defined herein, or in the other Parts of this Manual, definitions contained in the most recent edition of the "Uniform Vehicle Code," "AASHTO Transportation Glossary (Highway Definitions)," and other documents specified in Section 1A.11 are also incorporated and adopted by reference.

The following words and phrases, when used in this Manual, shall have the following meanings:”

“… 24. Engineering Study - the comprehensive analysis and evaluation of available pertinent information, and the application of appropriate principles, Standards, Guidance, and practices as contained in this Manual and other sources, for the purpose of deciding upon the applicability, design, operation, or installation of a traffic control device. An engineering study shall be performed by an engineer, or by an individual working under the supervision of an engineer, through the application of procedures and criteria established by the engineer. An engineering study shall be documented."

Under Title 23, since 1988, the safety value of the number posted on all posted speed limits required a supporting engineering study except those posted per Congress’ National Maximum Speed Limit. . In 1995, when Congress repealed the exceptions, all speed limit posting requirements returned to this 1988 extant law (Title 23), no exceptions. .

Sidebar: Notwithstanding, the USDOT (FHWA) instituted changes in the MUTCD to stop all challenges of noncompliant traffic control device use by removing all standard safeguards. . Including to never require an engineering study (safety audit) of a roadway as the foundation of traffic control decision, or for that matter, engineering judgment, ever, without review. . In recent examples, they removed prior Best Practice standards for stop sign warrants, and signal timing efficacy standards that required them to meet the safety needs of traffic. Engineering studies and periodic safety audits of roadways were also removed as well as the newest initiative to end Best Practice, the elimination of engineering studies or judgment foundations for the installation of traffic controls devices.